





Identifying the risk and assessing the frequency and severity of the risk

Pia Knudsen,
Ph.D. Pharm,
Senior Patient
Safety Officer





How can we identify risks?



Adverse drug events and medication errors: detection and classification methods

T morimoto, T K gandhi, A C seger, T C hsieh, D W Bates

Qual saf health care 2004;13:306–314.

Doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.010611



How can we identify risks?


- **Patient safety rounds**
 - Interviews, dialog and observations
 - Identify and discuss current and potential risks.
- **Global trigger tool**
 - A number of records is reviewed for the so-called triggers. If a trigger is present, it should be considered a warning sign and the records are examined in more detail.
- **Patient complaints and compensations**



How can we assess and learn from the incidents?

Calvin and Hobbes

by Bill Watterson



It depend on how you look at the problem




Age of safety management



Age of human factors



Age of technology



Simple linear model
Independent causes,
Failures, malfunctions

Sequential






Complex linear model
Interdependent causes
(active + latent)

Epidemiological

Non-linear model
Tight couplings, coincidences,
resonance, emergence

Systemic

Three generations of accident models

Accident model	Metaphor	Management principle	Nature of cause	Response type
<p><u>Sequential</u> Accident development is deterministic (cause-effect links) "Domino"</p>	 <p>A diagram illustrating the domino theory of accidents. It shows a sequence of four dominoes falling from left to right, indicated by a grey arrow at the bottom. The first domino is red and is falling, with motion lines around it. The second domino is white and is falling. The third and fourth dominoes are white and are standing upright. The dominoes have black dots on their top surfaces.</p>	<p>"Error" management</p>	<p>Causes can be clearly identified (root cause assumption)</p>	<p>Eliminating or containing causes will exclude accidents</p>
<p><u>Epidemiological</u> Accidents have both manifest and latent causes. "Swiss cheese", "Bowtie"</p>	 <p>A diagram illustrating the Swiss cheese model of accidents. It shows four slices of yellow Swiss cheese stacked on top of each other. Each slice has a hole. A red arrow points from the left through the holes of all four slices, representing a path to an accident. The holes are aligned in a straight line.</p>	<p>Performance deviation management</p>	<p>Blunt end / sharp end deviations have clear signatures</p>	<p>Deviations leading to accidents must be suppressed</p>
<p><u>Systemic</u> Variability can be helpful as well as disruptive. "Functional resonance"</p>	 <p>A diagram illustrating functional resonance. It shows a graph with a vertical axis and a horizontal axis. There are two oscillating lines: a black line and a red line. The black line oscillates with a regular frequency. The red line oscillates with a higher frequency and amplitude, and its peaks align with the peaks of the black line, representing resonance.</p>	<p>Performance variability management</p>	<p>Sources of variability can be identified and monitored</p>	<p>Some variability should be amplified, some reduced</p>



In order to learn from mistakes, we need an error classification

-
- Standardization
 - Filter the relevant information
 - 'Translator'




Components in error classification

Primary classification

- Impact—the outcome or effects of medical error and systems failure, commonly referred to as harm to the patient.
- Type—the implied or visible processes that were faulty or failed.
- Domain—the characteristics of the setting in which an incident occurred and the type of individuals involved.
- Cause—the factors and agents that led to an incident.
- Prevention and mitigation—the measures taken or proposed to reduce incidence and effects of adverse occurrences.

Conceptual Framework for the International Classification for Patient Safety



Risk assessment





Table 1. Patient safety culture maturity levels

Maturity Levels	Approach to Improving Patient Safety Culture
Pathological	No systems in place to promote a positive safety culture
Reactive	Systems are piecemeal, developed only in response to occurrences and/or regulatory or accreditation requirements
Calculative	Systematic approach to patient safety exists, but implementation is patchy and inquiry into events is limited to circumstances surrounding specific event
Proactive	Comprehensive approach to promoting a positive safety culture exists; evidence-based intervention implemented across the organization
Generative	Creation and maintenance of a positive safety culture are central to mission of the organization; organization evaluates the effectiveness of interventions and drains every last drop of learning from failures and successes and takes meaningful action to improve



Creating a Patient Safety Culture. Patient Safety Culture Improvement Tool: Development and Guidelines for Use
[Mark Fleming and Natasha Wentzell](#)
 Healthcare Quarterly, 11(Sp) March 2008: 10-15.doi:10.12927/hcq.2013.19604

Adverse Event Management Process





Severity assessment



Action Required	
1	Extreme risk – immediate action required – Reportable Incident Brief (RIB) for all SAC 1 incidents must be forwarded to the DoH within 24 hours. A Privileged Root Cause Analysis (RCA) investigation must be undertaken for all Clinical SAC 1 incidents with a report being submitted to the DoH.
2	High risk – need to notify senior management. Detailed investigation required. Ongoing monitoring of trended aggregated incident data may also identify and prioritise issues requiring a practice improvement project.
3	Medium risk – management responsibility must be specified – Aggregate data then undertake a practice improvement project. Exception – all financial losses must be reported to senior management.
4	Low risk – manage by routine procedures – Aggregate data then undertake a practice improvement project.

NB – An incident that rates a SAC 2, 3 or 4 should only be reported to the DoH if there is the potential for media interest or requires direct notification under existing DoH legislative reporting requirements or NSW DoH Policy Directive.


		CONSEQUENCE				
		Serious	Major	Moderate	Minor	Minimum
LIKELIHOOD	Frequent	1	1	2	3	3
	Likely	1	1	2	3	4
	Possible	1	2	2	3	4
	Unlikely	1	2	3	4	4
	Rare	2	3	3	4	4

Example from a Danish hospital – Action on different incidents

Type of accident	Classifikation	Method
Suicide		Root cause analysis
Medicine errors	SAC = 3 SAC < 3	Root cause analysis Local analysis
Confusion Surgery		Root cause analysis
Incidents	Faktuel score 2 Potentiel score 3	Aggregeted root cause analysis
Complaints and compensation		Journal audit

Adverse Event Management Process

18. december 2013
—
slide 15
—
præsentationens titel der kan
løbe over flere linjer





Risk evaluation and action

Human Error Type	Typical Forms	Common Prevention Strategies
Slip / Lapse	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Double capture• Omission• Interference• Perceptual Confusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Minimise interruptions• Forcing functions• Colour-coding, highlighting differences• Checklists, memory aids
Rule-Based Mistake	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strong-but-wrong• Exception to rule• Cognitive overload	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Minimise / highlight exceptions• Provide feedback• Manage workload
Knowledge-Based Mistake	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Confirmation bias• Out of sight, out of mind• Encystment• Vagabonding	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Decision support• Team work & CRM training

Adverse Event Management Process


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
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
præsentationens titel der kan
løbe over flere linjer





1. **PLAN:** Plan a change or test of how something works.
2. **DO:** Carry out the plan.
3. **STUDY:** Look at the results. What did you find out?
4. **ACT:** Decide what actions should be taken to improve.
5. **Repeat as needed until the desired goal is achieved**

Eksempel – The Danishes Case flow



Source of error analysis - from beginning to end



Step 1:

Select the topic or issue.

Step 2:

Establish the analysis team.

Step 3:

Develop workflow and identify risk areas

Step 4:

Identify the underlying causes.

Step 5:

Prepare action plans and monitoring plan.

Step 6:


Produce source of error analysis report



Organisation		Titel [Titel]		Dato	
Proces A		Afdeling 'Sikkerhed'		[Kategori]	
A1		Risiko Hvad kan gå galt? Konsekvens af risikoen	Sikkerhedskriterier		
A2			For- fordi	Alm. fordi	Sp. påhv.
A3					
A4					
A5					
A6					
A7					
A8					
A9					
A10					
A11					
A12					
A13					

**FEJLKILDEANALYSE
METODEBESKRIVELSE**

Dansk Selskab for
Patientsikkerhed





Act on Patient Safety


— Frontline personnel in hospitals and in the primary care sector are obligated to report adverse events to a national reporting system

Patients and relatives may report adverse events.

Regions and municipalities are obligated to act on the reports.


The Danish National Agency for Patients' Rights and Complaints is obligated to communicate the learning nationally.

The purpose of the reporting system is to learn, not punish.





Reported adverse events



Adverse events reported in 2012 in percent


WHO international classification for Patient Safety (ICPS)

	Municipals	Regional	Private	Other regions
Administrative processes	1,9			
Blood and blood components	0			
Buildings and infrastructure	0,1			
Gases and air for medical use	0			
Individual-team-organisation	0			
Infection	0,1			
Clinical processes	1,3	19,9	8,5	22,7
Communication og documentation	2,9	17,8	12,4	18,9
Medication	68,8	23,9	40,3	29,4
Medication equipment	0,3	4,3	4,7	1,1
Patient accidents	21,6	6,7	8,3	0,7
Self-harm, suicide attemps or suicide	0,1	0,9	0	0,1
Other incident type	1,5	3,1	3	1,2

Defined as:
 Medication Incidents include, for example prescribing the wrong drug or wrong dose, administering the wrong preparation or strength, and medication at the wrong time.




Medication Incidents - Process






Medication Incidents - Problem



Severity	Harm
No harm	No harm
Mild	Slight transient injury that does not require increased treatment or increased management efforts
Moderat	Transient injury requiring hospitalization or treatment by a medical practitioner or increased management efforts or for hospitalized patients increased treatment.
Serious	Permanent injuries requiring hospitalization or treatment by a medical practitioner or increased management efforts or for hospitalized patients increased treatment, or other injuries that require urgent life-saving treatment.
Deadly	Deadly

Adverse events reported in 2012 in percent





Incidents – assessed every week

- The incidents classified as 'dead'
- Medicine incidents classified as;
 - moderate
 - serious
 - dead



Publications

- Alerts
- Attentions
- Theme reports
- Newsletters
- Annual Report
- Info for users
- Presentations
- Seminars



THANK YOU



Pia Knudsen,
Ph.D. Pharm,
Senior Patient Safety Officer

**The Danish National Agency for
Patients' Rights and Complaints**

Telephone
+45 7228 6600

E-mail
pia@patientombuddet.dk

Web
www.patientombuddet.dk

Finsensvej 15
2000 Frederiksberg
Denmark